

# Reading list 2009–10

## 108 Political analysis and public choice

The current edition of the subject guide is the 2006 edition. This reading list was last updated in May 2009. Any queries about this reading list should be directed to [externalstudy@lse.ac.uk](mailto:externalstudy@lse.ac.uk).

### Essential reading

We recommend that you buy the following book:

Mueller, D.C. *Public Choice III*. (Cambridge University Press, 2003) [ISBN 9780521894753].

### Other highly recommended reading is:

Hargreaves Heap, Shaun, Martin Hollis, Bruce Lyons, Robert Sugden and Albert Weale *The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide*. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) [ISBN 9780631183228].

Laver, Michael *Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice*. (London: Sage, 1997) [ISBN 9780761951148].

McNutt, Patrick A. *The Economics of Public Choice*. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002) [ISBN 9781843760665] ch. 6.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek *Analyzing Politics*. (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co, 1997) [ISBN 9780393971071].

### Journal articles

Mitchell, William C. 'Interest groups: economic perspectives and contributions', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2(1) 1990, pp. 85–108.

Tsebelis, George. 'Veto Players and Institutional Analysis', *Governance* 13(4) 2000, pp. 441–74.

### Further reading

The first section, marked here with asterisks (\*) is particularly recommended.

\*Blais, Andre and Stephanie Dion (eds) *The Budget-Maximising Bureaucrat: Appraisal and Evidence*. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991) [ISBN 9780822936794].

\*Congleton, Roger D. 'The Median Voter Model', *The Encyclopedia of Public Choice*. Volume II 2004, pp. 382–387. Edited by Charles. K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider. (Dordrecht, Kluwer) [ISBN 9780792386070].

\*Dowding, Keith *The Civil Service*. (London: Routledge, 1995) [ISBN 9780415075688] Chapters 4–5.

\*Dowding, Keith *Power*. (Buckingham: Open University Press/Minnesota University Press, 1996) [ISBN 9780335194407] pp. 31–43.

\*Dowding, Keith 'Can Populism Be Defended? William Riker, Gerry Mackie and the Interpretation of Democracy', *Government & Opposition*, 41(3) 2006, p.327–346.

\*Downs, A. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. (Addison Wesley, 1997) Library of Congress Catalog No 57-10571, [ISBN 9780060417505] ch. 8 (though the whole book is worth reading).

\*Elster, Jon 'Introduction in *Rational Choice*'. Edited by Jon Elster (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) [ISBN 9780631138082] pp. 1–34.

- \*Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran 'Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures: A Formal Model and an Empirical Test', *Journal of Politics*, 58 1996, pp. 373–97.
- \*Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran 'Delegation and the Structure of Policy Making: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 11 1999, pp. 37–56.
- \*Laver, Michael *Private Desires, Political Action*. (London: Sage, 1997) [ISBN 9780761951155] ch. 7.
- \*Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast 'Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 19(2) 1994, pp. 149–179. Reprinted in Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast (eds) *Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions*. (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1995) [ISBN 9780472083190].
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- Axelrod, Robert *Conflict of Interest* (Chicago: Markham, 1970) [ISBN 9780841030206].
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- Bernholz, Peter 'Logrolling, Arrow Paradox and Cyclical Majorities', *Public Choice* (15) 1973, pp. 87–95.
- Black, Duncan 'On the Rationale of Group Decision-making', *Journal of Political Economy* (56) 1948, pp. 23–34.
- Davidson, Donald 'Actions, Reasons and Causes', *Journal of Philosophy* (60) 1963. Also appears in his *Essays on Actions and Events*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) [ISBN 9780198245292] pp. 3–19.
- Davidson, Donald 'The Emergence of Thought', *Erkenntnis* (51) 1999, pp. 7–17 Also appears in his *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) [ISBN 9780198237525] pp.123–134.
- Dowding, Keith 'Interpreting Formal Coalition Theory' in Keith Dowding and Desmond King (eds) *Preferences, Institutions and Rational Choice*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) [ISBN 9780198278955].
- Dowding, Keith 'Revealed Preference and External Reference', *Rationality and Society* 14(3) 2002, pp. 259–284.
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- Dowding, Keith, Peter John and Stephen Biggs 'Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature', *Urban Studies* 31(4-5) 1994 pp. 767–97.
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- Dunleavy, Patrick and Simon Bastow 'Modelling Coalitions that Cannot Coalesce: A Critique of the Laver-Shepsle Approach', *West European Politics* 24(1) 2001, pp. 1–26.
- Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran 'Administrative Procedures, Information and Agency Discretion', *American Journal of Political Science* (38) 1994, pp. 697–722.
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- Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle *Making and Breaking Governments*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) [ISBN 9780521438360].
- Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield *Multiparty Government*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) [ISBN 9780198272922].
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- Marwell, Gerald and Pamela Oliver *The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) [ISBN 9780521308397].
- Michael Laver *Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice*. (London: Sage, 1997) [ISBN 9780761951155] ch. 6.
- Mitchell, William C and Michael Munger 'Economic theories of interest groups', *American Journal of Political Science*, (35) 1991, pp. 512–46.
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Tiebout, Charles (1956) 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures'.

Tsebelis, George 'Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis', *American Political Science Review* 93(3) 1999, pp. 591–608.

Tsebelis, George *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. (New York: Princeton University Press, 2002) [ISBN 9780691099897].

## Journals

There are a number of political science journals that publish articles that mostly use public choice techniques. These include:

*Economics and Governance Economics & Politics*  
*Journal of Theoretical Politics*  
*Public Choice Quarterly Journal of Political Science*  
*Rationality and Society*

Many of the leading political science journals also carry many articles using public choice and analytical techniques including:

*American Journal of Political Science*  
*American Political Science Review*  
*British Journal of Political Science*  
*European Journal of Political Research*  
*European Union Politics*  
*Journal of Politics*  
*Political Organisation*

Some economics journals also carry political economy articles relevant to this unit (though they often use more advanced modelling techniques than those in political science journals).

*American Economic Review*  
*European Journal of Political Economy*  
*Journal of Political Economy*  
*Quarterly Journal of Economics*  
*Public Economics*

## Making use of the Online library

- To help you read extensively, all External students have free access to the University of London Online library where you will find the full text or an abstract for many of the journal articles listed for this unit.
- The Online library is accessed via the Student Portal at <http://my.londonexternal.ac.uk/>
- For most journals, the username and password you need is the same as the one which you have been sent to use for logging in to the Student Portal.